Problems and Visions for Improving Management of JR companies in three Islands and Japan Freight Railway Company by 大塚 良治 et al.
1. Introduction
April 1987, the defunct Japanese National Railway (JNR) established Japan Railway companies (JR 
companies or JR Group). Since JR Group started, we turned at a quater-century in April 2012.
“A report of the Japanese National Railway reconstruction administrative committee” said that 
since “workers have attitudes of dependence on the government and JNR is the National Railway and the 
government intervene management, then JNR tended to lack consciousness of improving production and 
reducing cost.”1 Herald=Steel [1986] said that public enterprises are intrinsically less efficient than private 
enterprises because they are insulated from the disciplines of the capital and product markets2.
Many local railways (the regional networks) in Japan were separated in the 1980s from JNR in 
the course of privatization because of their unprofitability, lower population density and higher rates of 
motorization3. These local railways had harmful impacts on balance of payments of JNR.
Although Japanese government emphasizes success of privatization and separation of JNR because of 
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freezing increasing fares, improving services and increasing corporate tax payment4, we are facing maladies 
of privatization and separation of JNR. For example, decreasing the frequency of trains on the regional 
networks and direct trains to other JR companies crossing stations on boundaries are these maladies. JNR 
basically established JR companies based on a plan of separation by regions, but because irrespective of 
JR East (East Japan Railway Company) in charge of the conventional lines of Tokyo and Kanagawa, JR 
West (West Japan Railway Company) in charge of the conventional lines of Shiga, kyoto, and Osaka, and 
JR Kyushu (Kyushu Railway Company) in charge of the conventional lines of the conventional lines of 
Fukuoka, the Shinkansen lines (Bullet train lines) are allocated to JR companies by lines, operators of the 
Shinkansen lines and operators of the parallel conventional lines were separated, then competition of both 
operators occurred.
Japanese government sold all shares of three JR companies in Honshu (JR East, JR Central (Central 
Japan Railway Company), and JR West) (hereafter, JRHs) on securities markets, then JRHs were “fully 
privatized.” On the other hand, since Japanese government can’t sell shares of JR companies in three 
Islands (JR Hokkaido (Hokkaido Railway Company), JR Shikoku (Shikoku Railway Company), and JR 
Kyushu) (hereafter, JRIs) and JRF (Japan Freight Railway Company) because of continuing deficits of these 
companies. Then Japanese government are assisting JRIs and JRF. 
For solving maladies of separation of JNR by regions (a example of horizontal separation), this paper 
makes a proposal plan for improving management of JRIs and JRF.
This paper makes a discussion in following orders: We affirm JNR reform and these problems in 
Section 2 JNR Privatization Reform and the Start of JR Group, in Section 3 Maladies of Privatization and 
Separation of JNR, and in Section 4 Managerial Tasks of JR Companies in Three Islands and JRF. And 
in Section 5 A Plan for Improving Management of JR Companies in Three Islands and JRF, we point out 
that since “techniques in accounting treatment” by Japanese government can’t lead to realize improving 
management of JRIs and JRF, then we must review management of JRIs and JRF, fundamentally. Finally, 
for solving maladies of separation of JNR by regions, we propose that Japanese government establishes a 
holding company or “Japan Railway Group Holdings Company (JRHD)” that control JRHs, JRIs, and JRF.
2. JNR Privatization Rreform and the Start of JR Group
JNR reconstruction administrative committee reported to Nakasone Cabinet a plan that JNR was 
privatized and separated to six passenger companies and one freight company. This report led to establishing 
six JR passenger companies and JRF5.
April 1987, JNR shifted to JNR Settlement Corporation (Article 15 of JNR Reform Act), and six JR 
passenger companies and JRF were started. JNR Settlement Corporation was a shareholder of seven JR 
companies. So seven JR companies were started as government-affiliated corporation.
As of 1987, Amount of long-term obligation of JNR was 2.54 trillion yen. Amount of long-term 
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obligations, including management stabilization fund of JRIs 1.3 trillion yen, reached to 37.1 trillion yen. 
This amount was broken down as follow: 25.5 trillion yen belonged to JNR Settlement Corporation, 11.6 
trillion yen belonged to JRHs and JRF6. JNR Settlement Corporation sold shares of JRHs to repay own 
obligations. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) published “Seisakushu 
2010” (A Collection of Policies 2010). This paper says “An Unfinished JNR Reform” must be accomplished, 
for maintaining and revitalizing the railway network on whole of country needed to deal with aging society 
and global environment problems and activate local economy, and JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, and JR 
Kyushu as an essential railway companies must stabilize theire financial ground and improve their revenue 
ground, and realize listing on securities markets at an early date”, then MLIT shows goals of early listing on 
securities markets of JRIs and JRF, clearly7.
So why Japanese government imposed goals of listing securities on JR companies. In July 3, 1958, 
Dai-4-ji Recommendation The 4th Recommendation recommended privatization and separation of JNR. 
And Kaikaku no Suishin-Taisei oyobi Ikou-Jiki-to Kokutetsu Kaikaku ni kansuru Iken―Tetsudo no Mirai 
wo Hiraku tameni― (A Plan of implementing JNR Reform and Moment of Change) published in July 26, 
1985 showed that “establishing efficient management style can be accomplished unambiguously by doing 
privatization and separation simultaneously. We can’t get public understanding about disposing enormous 
obligations, without securing preventing increasing future public financial burden anymore”8. We understand 
that privatization and separation of JNR are oriented as ways to dispose and separate enormous obligations 
of JNR and prevent increasing future public financial burden. Subsequently, Japanese government had come 
to consider that full privatization of JNR was best way to dispose and separate enormous obligations of JNR.
On the other hand, Japanese government is required to hold respective percentages of shares of 
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT), Japan Tobaco Inc (JT), and Nippon Expressway 
Companies (NEXCO), Japan Post Holdings Company (JP). For example, reasons that “Japan Post Holdings 
Company Limited is playing public roles of securing network of post offices and  universal service of postal 
services, management of this company must be not controlled by specific somebody, and for securing stable 
management and proper executions of operations, Japanese government is stable shareholder,” is presented9. 
For these reasons, we think that because JR companies are playing public roles of securing railway network, 
then holding certain percentage of shares of JR group by Japanese government is justified.
3. Maladies of Privatization and Separation of JNR
For example, Operators of the Shinkansen lines and the parallel conventional lines were separated, we 
can see it maladies of privatization and separation of JNR.
In July 26, 1985, JNR reconstruction administrative committee reported to Nakasone Cabinet a plan of 
privatization and separation of JNR, and a problem of selecting an operator of the section between Kokura 
and Hakata of Sanyo Shinkansen line emerged10.
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Because a number of passengers of this railway section was largest number as one-stop of Shinkansen 
lines, JR Kyushu had many unprofitable lines and were worried about severe business projections and then 
this company wanted to get this one-stop of Sanyo Shinkansen line.
Since the start of JR group, on a section between Kokura and Hakata in Fukuoka, JR Kyushu 
Kagoshima main line (the parallel conventional line) have severely competed with JR West Sanyo 
Shinkansen line.
After the start of JR, on this railway section, JR West increased the frequency of Shinkansen trains. 
On the other hand, JR Kyushu introduced the luxury limited express trains and have sold discount limited 
express ticket against JR West.
But in March 12, 2011, a section between Hakata and Shin-Yatsushiro of Kyushu Shinkansen line 
opened, then direct communications between Sanyo Shinkansen line and Kyushu Shinkansen line were 
inaugurated. On a section between Kokura and Hakata, although JR West and JR Kyushu are rivals each 
other, but the start of direct communication between both Shinkansen lines led to enter partnership.
Why JR Kyushu severely competes with JR West? We’ll tell you why all JR group are individual 
private companies and have no capital ties between each other11.
As seen above, privatization and separation of JNR resulted in competions of JR companies each other. 
That is conflict resulted from privatization and separation of JNR.
Moreover, in March 12, 2011, with opening of a section between Hakata and Shin-Yatsushiro of 
Kyushu Shinkansen line, JR Kyushu abolised arrangements of discounting limited express charge on the 
conventional lines applied in case of changing between the Shinkansen trains and the limited express trains on 
the conventional lines. We see it as maladies of privatization and separation of JNR. And since Tokaido and 
Sanyo Shinkansen lines and Kyushu Shinkansen line have different limited express charge table, passengers on 
through trains between Tokaido and Sanyo Shinkansen lines and Kyushu Shinkansen line must pay combined 
amount of each limited express charges of Tokaido and Sanyo Shinkansen lines and Kyushu Shinkansen line. 
Although Shinkansen limited express charges are permitted by MLIT (Paragraph 1 of Article 16 of Railway 
Business Act, and Paragraph 1 of Article 32 of enforcement regulation of Railway Business Act), about 
applications for approval of price-cap regulation for limited express charges of Kyushu Shinkansen line, the 
Transport Council authorized as “minor case” in a document dated December 21, 2010. This authorization 
is called “hearing case”, that is authorization that is needless to report to the Transport Council. On the other 
hand, about limited express charges on the conventional lines, railway companies must notify MLIT (Paragraph 
4 of Article 16 of Railway Business Act). In sum, because all JR group are individual private companies, 
introducing respective limited express charge tables is convinient for JR companies to secure revenue and is 
easy institutionally. If Japanese government hadn’t separated JNR by regions, we think a JR company wouldn’t 
introduced each limited express charge tables on each lines. We see this point as apperance of one of maladidies 
of separation of JNR.
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4. Managerial Tasks of JR Companies in Three Islands and Japan Freight Railway Company
JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, and JR Kyushu have reported operating deficits of railway business after the 
start of JR every year. Because JRIs have less profitable lines than JRHs, Japanese govenrnment gave JRIs 
management stabilization fund, and expected that would operate this fund and earn return on this fund, then 
JRIs make this return up for operating deficits. Additionally Japanese govenrnment are providing exemption 
of fixed asset tax and others.
Initially JNR reconstruction administrative committee expect 1 trillion yen as management stabilization 
fund of JRIs12, but on the start of JR, Japanese government increased this fund to 1.2781 trillion yen (JR 
Hokkaido 0.6822  trillion yen, JR Shikoku 0.2082 trillion yen, and JR Kyushu 0.3877 trillion yen). Japanese 
government expect Management stabilization fund as function of “magic mallet.” 13
Figure 1 shows operating return on equity (ROE) of JRHs, JRIs, JRF, and Major Private Railway 
companies (MPRs). Average ROE of JRIs is negative.
As seen above, under declining birth rate and depopulation are expected, JRIs will face more severe 
external conditions.
JR Kyushu opened Kyushu Shinkansen line, and JR Hokkaido is appealing to Japanese government 
to support early extension of Hokkaido Shinkansen line to Sapporo. Since both companies don’t have many 
profitable lines, both companies  have great expectations on Shinkansen lines.
Especially operating deficits of railway business of JR Kyushu is covered by operating income of non-
railway business. In fiscal year of 2012, operating deficits of railway business of JR Kyushu is 11.74 billion 
yen, and operating income of non-railway business is 13.294 billion yen, then total operating income is 1.55 
billion yen.
JR Hokkaido caused a fire and derail accident on Sekisho line in May 27, 2011. After that accident, JR 
Photo 1	 JR West Sanyo Shinkansen line Series 
700-7000s “Hikari Rail Star”
Photo 2	 JR Kyushu Kagoshima main line Series 
883 “Sonic”
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Hokkaido have been causing many accidents and incidents, and falsifying inspection data. Finally, MLIT 
put supervision mandate to JR Hokkaido based on Act on Passenger Railway Companies and Japan Freight 
Railway Company (JR Companies Act).
JR Shikoku have less competitiveness against expressways, and have a hard race time with intercity 
competition14. But JR Shikoku have great competitiveness of transport of commute to schools15.
As “the Type II railway operator” in Railway Business Act, JRF is operating freight trains by paying 
track usage charges based on “avoidable cost” to JR passenger companies. With opening of Shinkansen 
lines, JR passenger companies can transfer their parallel conventional lines to third sector (public-private 
mixed) companies. Then that transfer makes it impossible for JRF to use tracks of the parallel conventional 
lines based on “avoidable cost.” Without applying “avoidable cost,” JRF leads to face increasing track 
usage charges and serious financial problems. For avoiding these problems, for some time, Japan Railway 
Construction, Transport and Technology Agency (JRTT) gives JRF “Freight Assistance Grants”, that is the 
same as amount of increasing track usage charges. JRF is hereby avoiding problems of increasing track usage 
charges by abolishing “avoidable cost” when JR passenger companies transfer the parallel conventional lines 
to third sector companies, for a while.
In sum, management of JRIs and JRF have tough problems. Japanese government gave JR Hokkaido 
and JR Shikoku 220 billion yen and 140 billion yen of non-interest loan, respectively, or in effect, made an 
increasing management stabilization funds of both companies, then JR Hokkaido and JR Shikoku bought 
special bond issued by JRTT, and will receive interest (return on this fund) of 2.5% of annual rate.
But we see this “acounting techniques” as mentioned above will not be able to realize improving 
management of JRIs and JRF. For realizing improving management of these companies, managements styles 
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Figure1 JR･Major Private Railways (MPRs) Return on Equity (As of March 2013)
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of JR group must be revised, drastically.
5. A Plan for Improving Management of JR companies in three Islands and Japan Freight Railway Company
(1)A Proposal of Establishing a Holding Company “Japan Railway Group Holdings”
As mentioned earlier, with privatization and separation of JNR, all JR group are individual private 
companies and have no capital ties between each other, then JR companies have managed in their own 
managerial policies and strategies.
After separation of JNR, JR companies have come to prefer their profit than cooperating with other JR 
companies. These are maladies of separation of JNR.
For solving these problems, we propose that Japanese government establishes a holding company or 
“Japan Railway Group Holdings (JRHD)” that control JR companies. We see this proposal is effective to 
improve management of JRIs and JRF. Practical steps are as follow:
(Step 1) Revise Article 1 of JR Companies Act as “East Japan Railway Company, Central Japan Railway 
Company, West Japan Railway Company, Hokkaido Railway Company, Shikoku Railway Company, Kyushu 
Railway Company are corporations intended that manage passenger railway businesses and accompanying 
businesses.” Next, set Article 1 (2) specifying as “Japan Railway Group Holdings Company is corporation 
intended that doing holding shares of East Japan Railway Company, Central Japan Railway Company, 
West Japan Railway Company, Hokkaido Railway Company, Shikoku Railway Company, Kyushu Railway 
Company, Japan Freight Railway Company (hereafter, business corporations).” By setting this article, JR 
companies are under the control of JRHD.
(Step 2) Set Paragraph 1 of Article 3 specifying as “of newly total shares issued when Japan Railway 
Group Holdings Company is established, Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency 
undertakes all of shares.” Then set Paragraph 2 of Article 3 specifying as “Japan Railway Group Holdings 
Company holds all of shares of Hokkaido Railway Company, Shikoku Railway Company, Kyushu Railway 
Company, Japan Freight Railway Company at all times.” And set Paragraph 3 of Article 3 specifying as 
“Japan Railway Group Holdings Company holds one third of shares of East Japan Railway Company, 
Central Japan Railway Company, West Japan Railway Company at all times.” Meanwhile, abolish Article 5 
of Supplementary Provisions.
(Step 3) Three JRHs do third-party allocation of shares to JRHD, and JRHD make a takeover bid for a 
portion of shares of JRHs, JRHD will be holding above one third of shares of JRHs. Japanese government 
invest added capital for JRHD to purchase shares of three JRHs.
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(Step 4) Revise existing Article 12 as new Article 12 specifying as “Hokkaido Railway Company, Shikoku 
Railway Company, Kyushu Railway Company manage amount that equivalent to amount of claims acquired 
based on Paragraph 1 of Article 7 of Supplementary Provisions as Management Stabilization Fund (hereafter, 
“fund”), and appropriate return resulted by managing fund to cover expenses needed for operating business.” 
(Step 5) revise existing Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of JR Companies Act as new Paragraph 2 of Article 1 
specifying as “Japan Freight Railway Company is a corporation intended that manage freight railway 
businesses, long-distance passenger railway businesses, and accompanying businesses. This will enable JRF 
to operate overnight trains.
Finally, JRHD will be a shareholder holding 100% of shares of JRIs and JRF, and above one third of 
shares of JRHs.
As a result, because JRHD can receive above one third of total amount of dividends of JRHs, JRHD (or 
Japanese government, or JRTT) can allocate that dividend revenue for assisting JRIs and JRF.
We see that asserting of tightening regulations on JR companies will be attracted objections of running 
counter to the moves toward deregulations. In Britain, after Railways Act of 1993 became effective, in April 
1994, British Rail or the national railway was privatized to establish Railtrack plc that possess and manage 
railway infrastructure. And Train Operating Companies or TOC were established to operate trains, and had 
been privatized all of the companies through the bid tendering before 1997. In sum, vertical separation of 
operating trains and possessing infrastructure were conducted16. But the Hatfield rail crash brought Railtrack 
to destruction, then Railtrack was wound up and handed down to Network Rail Limited17. Network Rail does 
not pay dividends, but this does not mean that this company is ‘not-for-profit’. This company has a clear 
incentive to generate profits so that these profits can be reinvested in the network for the bebefit of customers 
and users of the railway18.
As can be seen from examples of Britain, JR companies must be operated based on sharing roles of 
public and private. To solve management problems of JRIs and JRF, we see that Japanese government needs 
to make a specific involvement on JR companies, and make drastic changes on management styles of JR 
companies.
As seen above, we see drastic changes of JR Group lead to solve serious problems of JR companies in 
three Islands and JRF (Figure 2).
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(2)Securing Financial Resources
Then how much dose JRHD need to purchase above one third of shares of JRHs? See Table 1.
Table1 The necessary amount and annual dividends in the case that JRHD purchases above one third of 
shares of three JR companies in Honshu
company aggregate market value (trillion yen)
necessary amount
(trillion yen)
purchasing number of
shares (100 million shares)
annual dividends
(billion yen)
JR East 3.0423 1.0141 1.31666667 15.8
JR Central 2.3731 0.791 0.716667* 6.5
JR West 0.8321 0.2774 64.578333 7.1
6.2475 2.0825 ― 29.4
*The number is before share splitting, as of March,2012.
Table1 shows JRHD receive 29.4 billion yen of annual dividend revenue in the case that JRHD 
purchases above one third of shares of JRHs.
With revision of Act of disposing of obligations of Japanese National Railway Settlement Corporation, JR 
Hokkaido and JR Shikoku received 220 billion yen and 140 billion yen of increasing management stabilization 
fund, respectively―in accounting procedures, treated as non-interest borrowing for undertaking special bonds 
issued by JRTT―, and JRIs and JRF are given 179.5 billion yen of non-interest loans for executing capital 
investment. Total amounts of non-interest loans are 539.5 billion yen.
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Figure2 By establishing a Holding Company, scheme for realizing sustainable management of JR 
companies in three islands and JR Freight Company
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Japanese government may call in these loans from JRIs and JRF to give JRHD added capital. This 
enable JRHD to purchase a portion of shares of JRHs. For example, financial resources of other 1.543 trillion 
yen (= 2.0825 trillion yen-0.5395 trillion yen) are as follows: in a little over half of 0.4813 trillion yen of 
retained earnings of special service account of JRTT, or 0.25 trillion yen, 1 trillion yen of 9.2 trillion yen of 
revenue from transferring of Shinkansen line facilities to JR companies, and other 0.293 trillion yen is from 
issuing bonds based on gasoline excise and others.
6. Conlusions
In this paper, we affirmed JNR Privatization Reform and the Start of JR Group in Section 2, Maladies 
of Privatization and Separation of JNR in Section 3, and Managerial Tasks of JR Companies in Three Islands 
and JRF in Section 4. And in Section 5 A Plan for Improving Management of JR Companies in Three Islands 
and Japan Freight Railway Company, we pointed out that “techniques in accounting treatment” by Japanese 
government couldn’t lead to realize improving management of JRIs and JRF, so we must review management 
styles of JRIs and JRF, fundamentally. Finally, for solving maladies of separation of JNR by regions, we 
proposed that establishing a holding company or “Japan Railway Group Holdings Company (JRHD)” that 
control JR companies by Japanese government, and purchasing above one third of shares of JRHs by JRHD.
As a result, because JRHD can receive above one third of total amount of dividends of JRHs, JRHD 
can allocate that dividend revenue to assist JRIs and JRF. Drastic changes of JR Group lead to solve serious 
problems of JRIs and JRF.
As financial resources, we proposed that usage of calling in loans to JRIs and JRF by Japanese 
government, retained earnings of special service account of JRTT, revenue from transferring of Shinkansen 
line facilities to JR companies, and revenue from issuing bonds based on gasoline excise and others.
Establishing JRHD leads to realize to receive dividends from JRHs, and allocate this dividend revenue 
to assist JRIs and JRF. These measures lead to reduce the public burden to the lowest possible level, and 
improve management of JRIs and JRF.
We see that asserting of tightening regulations on JR companies will be attracted objections of running 
counter to the moves toward deregulations, but we have to beware by Britain’s case.
In a quarter-century after privatization and separation of JNR, drastic changes of JR Group are 
essential. We hope Japanese government makes a bold political decision for establishing JRHD.
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(30 years of Hakata Shinkansen (3) A section between Kokura and Hakata belonged to West Japan Railway 
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Interview (An Interview with President of JR Shokoku, Izumi Masafumi,” 47 Gyousei Journal, April 13, 2012. 
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Problems and Visions for Improving Management of JR companies in three Islands and Japan Freight Railway Company
JR 三島会社・JR 貨物の経営改善に向けた課題と展望
大塚 良治
【抄録】
　国は運賃の据え置きやサービス改善、法人税を納めるようになったこと等をもって国鉄分割民営化の成果を
強調しているが、地方交通線を中心とする不採算路線での運行本数減少や、JR 旅客会社を跨ぐ列車の減少など、
弊害も見受けられるようになってきた。国鉄の地域分割の弊害を緩和するために、持株会社「日本鉄道グルー
プホールディングス（JRHD）（仮称）」を政府主導で設立することを提案する。JR に対する公的規制の強化
に対しては、規制緩和の流れに逆行するとの反論も考えられるが、大事故をきっかけに鉄道に対する公的関
与を再強化したイギリスの事例もある。JR 各社を傘下に収めることで、JRHD は本州 3 社から得る配当収入
を三島会社および JR 貨物の支援に充てることが可能となる。
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